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Abstract 
Human biobanks, which are the core of BBMRI-ERIC medical research infrastructure, are 
repositories of biological material and data associated with the research participants (donors or 
patients willing to participate in the research). The associated data covers a broad range of data 
types: from data collected directly from the research participants and medical processes related to 
them, to data generated from the biological material. This document focuses on describing 
biobank data processing workflows that were selected for piloting in EGI-Engage the biobanks by 
the BBMRI.nl and BBMRI.cz (national nodes of BBMRI-ERIC) together with their associated 
biobanks. The main focus is on proteomics and genomics workflows, which cover both extremes of 
privacy-sensitive data processing spectrum: from relatively non-sensitive applications to very 
sensitive ones. 
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1 IntroducƟon
Human biobanks, which are the core of BBMRI-ERIC medical research infrastructure, are repositories
of biological material and data associated with the research parƟcipants (i.e., donors or paƟents will-
ing to parƟcipate in the research). The associated data spans a broad range of data types: from data
collected directly from the research parƟcipants and medical processes pertaining to them, to data gen-
erated from their biological material via, e.g., laboratory experiments or imaging devices, to addiƟonal
data such as environmental exposure or lifestyle data (which will become parƟcularly abundant due to
availability of wearables devices) – as shown in Figure 1. Biobanks also provide services based on their
capaciƟes (e.g., hosƟng of samples and data) and their experƟse (e.g., analysis of data from molecular
experiments, data integraƟon). All of these resources are made available for research purposes. This
requires access to the data in a suitable way (SFTP, permanent storage, HPC storage), but also access
to the necessary processing resources (HPC/compute, pipelines & soŌware). Because they are dealing
with human biological material and data, BBMRI-ERIC biobanks need to pay parƟcular aƩenƟon to as-
pects of data protecƟon, since privacy protecƟon of donors (populaƟon biobanks) or paƟent subjects
(from disease biobanks) are one of the keys to trustworthiness of the research infrastructure.
Following the unprecedented growth of the size of research data in medicine and biology, as witnessed
in genomics, proteomics, metabolomics and other types of so called “omics” data, as well as large scale
imagery and lifestyle data, BBMRI-ERIC has become part of the EGI-Engage project in BBMRI Compe-
tence Centre (BBMRI CC), in order to explore how cloud-based scalable data processing and storage can
be used to improve the research process. BBMRI-ERIC is parƟcipaƟng in the BBMRI CC together with
several naƟonal nodes, BBMRI.cz, BBMRI.nl and BBMRI.se, which agreed to contribute their selected
workﬂows and explore their applicability to the cloud scenarios.
This deliverable provides an overview of the workﬂows, that were idenƟﬁed by the naƟonal nodes as a
good candidates for their piloƟng within BBMRI CC. We have tried to cover a broad spectrum of work-
ﬂows: from privacy-sensiƟve workﬂows that are speciﬁc to medical research dealing with individual
research parƟcipants data, to less sensiƟve or non-sensiƟve workﬂows that are representaƟves of more
generic biological and chemical analyƟcal processes. This should span a signiﬁcant breadth of needs of
biobanks: from applicaƟons, that are typically restricted to very protected storage and processing envi-
ronments, to applicaƟons that can unleash the full potenƟal of scalability of the cloud compuƟng (and
that are expected to be sharedwithmany other domains). Theworkﬂows are, however, not covering the
whole breadth of workﬂows that are run by the biobanks – we know this from the parƟcipaƟng naƟonal
nodes (we are aware that other naƟonal nodes are also running other types of processing such as large-
scale image analysis in BBMRI.it and BBMRI.nl), but this selecƟons had to be made due to constrained
work capacity available in the BBMRI CC.
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Figure 1: Flow of data into the biobanks.
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2 DescripƟon of Selected RepresentaƟve Use Cases
Belowwe describe representaƟve use cases from the biobank domain. These use cases have in common
the following aspects that are to some extent speciﬁc to the expectaƟons that biobanks and their users
have from EGI and other cloud services:
1. ability to provide access to isolated areas of storage and compute using federated authenƟcaƟon,
2. ability for user groups to deploy standard soŌware and/or pipelines,
3. (opƟonally for speciﬁc workﬂows) a proof that the ‘digital research environments’ are up to hos-
pital standards.
Below we ﬁrst summarize example use cases from proteomics and genomics and subsequently discuss
addiƟonal security constraints that are required by some biobanks (such as larger biobanks with exten-
sive regulaƟons and/or paƟent biobanks).
2.1 Proteomics
Proteomics is the analysis of proteins in samples from thehumanbody (this is speciﬁc to humanbiobanks)
typically using mass spectrometry. It relies on idenƟfying diﬀerent proteins in the samples by matching
their known “mass spectrum footprints” based on available databases. Proteomics is not used for di-
agnosƟc purposes as of now, since it is expensive (cost of equipment purchase and maintenance) and
sƟll not standardized and precise enough for clinical use. Proteomics plays an important role in medical
research because it helps ﬁnd biomarkers used in diagnosƟc and health procedures.
Cloud infrastructure can be eﬀecƟvely uƟlized for the proteomics analysis for those users that either do
not have the suﬃcient hardware, orwho perform the analyses at high volumes and need elasƟc compute
capacity that can scale up based on the requirements.1 If third party cloud infrastructures are used, they
can analyse the data extremely fast and the network transmissions of data may become the boƩleneck
and the improvement would not be signiﬁcant; hence in order to uƟlize an infrastructure provided by a
third party, network links with appropriate capacity are required.
Data are not sensiƟve from perspecƟve of paƟent data privacy: the output from mass spectrometry
or from downstream analysis itself does not contain any informaƟon that could be reasonably used to
idenƟfy the original paƟent.
1Hardware for mass spectrometry is substanƟally more costly than the compuƟng hardware, hence for small-scale analyses
with stable compute capacity requirements, this is less aƩracƟve.
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2.2 Processing of Genomics Data
New ‘next-generaƟon sequencing’ technology (NGS) are enabling increasingly large DNA and RNA ex-
periments. DNA can be considered as a “book” that consists of 23 chapters (chromosomes) containing
a total of ∼30,000 words (regions of the DNA we call genes). As a whole, the book containing DNA is
transcribed (copied) to RNA molecules that, in turn, result in the proteins that consƟtute much of the
human body. The human genome consists of about three billion building blocks (base pairs, or leƩers in
our book analogy) from an alphabet of four leƩers (ACTG). Of these 3 billion only <1% makes up known
genes; the other 99% of leƩers between the genes we think have a ‘regulatory’ funcƟon that inﬂuences
which genes are switched ‘on’ or ‘oﬀ’, thus controlling how many copies of RNA are made from DNA
during over the cells’ lifeƟme. There is sƟll much to be studied and understood in this area.
At the DNA level, NGS enables the measurement of mulƟple or even all genes at once (also called ‘ex-
ome’) or even the measurement of the whole of the DNA (whole genome). These observaƟons enable
ﬁne grained characterisaƟon of all DNA variaƟon points between individuals, i.e., diﬀerences in ‘geno-
type’. This informaƟon forms the basis for analyses to idenƟfy the geneƟc determinant of heritable traits
and to diagnose diseases caused by DNA mutaƟons. At the RNA level one can measure the quanƟty of
RNA products per gene (transcripts) and/or even genotype each of the RNA products to invesƟgate dif-
ferences at the RNA level. Much of the focus of this research is now on ‘personalized medicine and
health’—for instance how can we predict what (expensive) medicine is most appropriate given a pa-
Ɵent’s DNA and RNA proﬁles.
To extract informaƟon from these NGS data a signiﬁcant amount of computaƟonal analysis is required.
The analysis consists of a series of computaƟonal steps, which are oŌen collecƟvely referred to as a
‘pipeline’. First the data need to be made ready for analysis (what is called ‘processing’) because the
NGS process does not actually produce complete sequences of whole chromosomes; instead it mea-
sures small fragments of 100–200 base pairs. Then, the analysis starts with large ﬁles (GBs) that contains
thousands of fragments (‘reads’), i.e., short text sequences of CATG. The ﬁrst processing step is to recon-
struct these fragments into complete chromosomes, which is typically done by aligning the fragments
to the known human ‘reference’ genome. Subsequently, the diﬀerences between the experimentally
derived sequence and the reference are computed by variant calling, resulƟng in a lisƟng of the diﬀer-
ences. On average these variaƟons amount to about 1 leƩer per stretch of 1000 base pairs although
also larger diﬀerences are common (deleƟons, inserƟon, translocaƟons). During processing many inter-
mediate steps are needed. In case of RNA, the number of reads per gene is quanƟﬁed as a proxy for
quanƟfying ‘gene expression’—i.e., the amount of RNA per gene. Finally, large staƟsƟcal analysis can
be done comparing DNA variaƟon of many individuals to phenotypes (such as disease or height) and/or
comparing RNA expression. Also, in case of diagnosƟcs, individual genotypes/RNA expression can be
compared to known reference data as basis for diagnosis.
A key aspect of the procedures is that analysis environments must be portable such that data and
pipelines can be rapidly deployed on a new facility. For example, in UMC Groningen thre are two re-
search clusters and two diagnosƟc clusters next to the BBMRI.nl central clusters, and it is essenƟal that
data and pipelines can be moved or replicated across these clusters in a reproducible way.
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2.3 SensiƟvity consideraƟons for human subject research clouds
For rouƟne analysis with constant workloads many biobanks and research insƟtutes have acquired ad-
equate HPC faciliƟes. However, in many cases data from mulƟple biobanks needs to be integrated in
order to reach suﬃcient staƟsƟcal power. Typically, such large analyses are implemented as a large
mulƟ-center (and oŌen even mulƟ-naƟonal) consorƟums where researchers frommany insƟtutes need
to collaborate around the data, requiring centralized access to data and analysis procedures. Such large-
scale faciliƟes are beyond what individual insƟtutes can provision, so there is a demand for ‘cloud’ so-
luƟons (IaaS, SaaS) that enable research consorƟa to have a ‘digital research environment for human
subject research data’ on which to conduct their analyses with suitable faciliƟes. Naturally, this demand
for scale-out faciliƟes is very much present among BBMRI-ERIC Members.
New research methods such as NGS and ‘personalized medicine’ are also rapidly uptaken in the context
of healthcare. In addiƟon the speed at which new analysis methods are translated from research to
health care is increasing. As diagnosƟcs facility oŌen don’t have access to HPC faciliƟes, BBMRImembers
are oŌen asked to also make analysis pipelines available to diagnosƟcs labs, where they have to meet or
exceed high operaƟng standards (Stand OperaƟng Procedures = SOPs) and privacy constraints. However,
next to the requirement of pipeline portability that was previously menƟoned, hospitals oŌen also have
addiƟonal requirements before the hospital, such as high standards for validaƟon/veriﬁcaƟon and SOPs
(which the BBMRI-ERICMembers can provide). Moreover, hospitals also need access to suitable storage
and compute faciliƟes that implement high availability measures while considering ethical, legal and
societal implicaƟons, such as ensuring privacy, which introduce signiﬁcant technical complexity.
Some biobanks and all hospitals will therefore require proof that the research environment adheres to
suﬃcient measures for informaƟon security. This is in parƟcular relevant because DNA is very idenƟﬁ-
able data of which a fracƟon is suﬃcient to re-idenƟfy a person. Also, DNA is oŌen compared to all kinds
of phenotypes that also might be sensiƟve, such as (predisposiƟon for) disease. So any implementaƟon
of cloud soluƟons will need to be evaluated against these consideraƟons.
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3 Proposed Pilot Workﬂows and EvaluaƟon
This secƟon provides an overview of the parƟcular workﬂows that will be implemented in the BBMRI
Competence Centre of EGI-Engage. They fall into two categories
• workﬂows that do not handle privacy-sensiƟve data and are therefore good candidates to be pro-
cessed on the wider EGI FedCloud infrastructure for improved scalability;
• privacy-sensiƟve workﬂows that will use the private cloud infrastructures built in the biobanks
using EGI FedCloud (or possibly by BBMRI-ERIC NaƟonal Nodes and provided to the biobanks as
virtual private cloud infrastructure).
Theﬁrst category covers several diﬀerent proteomicsworﬂows, which are themain focus of theBBMRI.cz
NaƟonal Node and RECAMO biobank involved in the EGI-Engage, related to idenƟﬁcaƟon and quanƟﬁ-
caƟon of proteins in the biological samples and analysis of their properƟes. These workﬂows are part
of the producƟon processes embedded in the medical research of the RECAMO biobank. In the future,
these can be extended with computaƟonally more demanding workﬂows, such as OpenSWATH-based
idenƟﬁcaƟon of candidate proteins for biomarkers based on heatmap diﬀerences of proteins between
healthy Ɵssues and tumors for paƟent groups with idenƟcal diagnoses. The data formats used in the
proteomics applicaƟons and further referenced in this report are described in [1].
On behalf of the BBMRI.nl, we plan to try and implement the processing pipeline for NGS DNA alignment
and genotyping in the cloud, typically the ﬁrst and most computaƟonally intensive analysis step before
the biobank data analysis can commence. This pipeline is an example for many more pipelines and
once this pilot is successful we expect to also deploy RNA genotyping and and GWAS genotype array
imputaƟon pipelines. Finally, we evaluate the pilots against the requirements with parƟcular aƩenƟon
to portability (which is a key requirement for these pipelines) and informaƟon security (which is essenƟal
before sensiƟve data from biobanks and hospitals can be allowed to be sent to cloud providers).
3.1 Workﬂow: IdenƟﬁcaƟon of proteins
The objecƟve of protein idenƟﬁcaƟon is to idenƟfy an unknown protein. In this idenƟﬁcaƟon procedure,
the unknown protein is typically broken up into its component pepƟdes; the pepƟdes are then ionized
and introduced into the mass spectrometer which will determine their mass. The measured mass of
the pepƟdes (raw outcome from mass spectrometry in .raw format) is used as the input to an analyƟc
soŌware (Proteome discoverer) which searches database of known proteins and matches the hit based
on similarity of mass spectra. The result is list of proteins and probability of hit.
• GOAL: idenƟfy unknown protein
• INPUT:
– .raw ﬁle (approx. 1 GB), containing mass of pepƟdes
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• PROCESS:
– Find thebest probable hit in database of knownproteins (free downloadable,2 approx. 300MB,
text ﬁle: name and sequence, .fasta).
– Approx. 1–6 hours on a workstaƟon PC (depends on protein database size and on parame-
ters).
– Used soŌware: Proteome Discoverer.3
• OUTPUT:
– .msf [2]
– List of proteins from the database that best match the measured pepƟde proﬁle, along with
the probability of hit.
• PARALLELISM
– at least on the level of individual analyses
3.2 Workﬂow: Protein quanƟtaƟon
The goal is to measure themass of protein in a sample. The obtained informaƟon can be further used to
understand cancer behaviour by comparing the level of protein in healthy Ɵssue with the tumor, since
the change of protein level might be an important disease biomarker.
There are two basic types of quanƟtaƟon: label-free or label. In the label-free method all samples
are measured separately and then analyzed; this results is a lot of ﬁles and the method is more Ɵme
consuming. On the other hand, the label method uses the isotopes to mark sample. Two or more
samples are mixed together and put into mass spectrometer. Thanks to the isotopes the device can
disƟnguish between the pepƟdes from diﬀerent samples and it can measure all of them in one single
run.
In summary, the label-free: more data generated and needed for analysis, reproducible, more precise,
more Ɵme and computaƟonal resources needed; label: generates less data, faster, less computaƟonal
resources needed for analysis, more expensive (labels), less reproducible. QuanƟtaƟon can be relaƟve
or absolute. RelaƟve is faster and formany purposes fully suﬃcient (output is the raƟo amongmeasured
samples).
• GOAL: Measure amount of proteins in sample. It can be used to compare protein levels in tumor
and in healthy Ɵssue.
• INPUT:
2 http://www.uniprot.org/downloads
3 https://www.thermofisher.com/order/catalog/product/IQLAAEGABSFAKJMAUH
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– .wiﬀ (label of label-free method) or .raw (label method)
• PROCESS:
– Find thebest probable hit in database of knownproteins (free downloadable,4 approx. 300MB,
text ﬁle: name and sequence, .fasta).
– First you idenƟfy relaƟve amount of protein types in sample and then compare tuples. For
more precise analysis the idenƟﬁcaƟon is done with X outputs frommass spectrometer (i.e.,
x .wiﬀ ﬁles of tumor and x .will ﬁles of healthy Ɵssue). The analysis is more computaƟonally
intensive than idenƟﬁcaƟon and it needs more RAM (i.e., 2 ∗ x ∗ 2–5GB).
– Approx. 24 hours on a workstaƟon PC.
– Used SW:
* Label freemethod: Protein Pilot5 (idenƟﬁcaƟon), PeakView6 (quanƟtaƟon),MarkerView7
(staƟsƟcal analysis, visualizaƟon of results)
* Label method: Proteome discoverer (both idenƟﬁcaƟon and quanƟtaƟon)
• OUTPUT:
– RelaƟve amount of protein types in sample, diﬀerence between/among given samples.
• PARALLELISM
– at least on the level of individual analyses
3.3 Workﬂow: HDX analysis
InformaƟon about change of protein structure aŌer interacƟon with ligand (based on the change of
deuteraƟon) - comparison of protein deuteraƟon without ligand with protein deuteraƟon with ligand.
This is used to explore protein folding and drug interacƟons (ligands) with proteins.
• INPUT:
– .raw data (approx. 0.5 GB)
• PROCESS:
– ComputaƟonally intensive
– Used SW: HDExaminer8
4 http://www.uniprot.org/downloads
5 http://sciex.com/products/software/proteinpilot-software
6 http://sciex.com/products/software/peakview-software
7 http://sciex.com/products/software/markerview-software
8 http://www.massspec.com/HDExaminer.html
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• OUTPUT:
– 5–15GB of output data per experiment (size depends on experiment extent)
• PARALLELISM
– at least on the level of individual analyses
3.4 Workﬂow: DNA alignment and genotyping
As pilot we propose to use the BBMRI.nl DNA pipeline. This pipeline converts raw sequence fragments
(reads) for each sample into a genotype ﬁle, which contains the DNA diﬀerences of each sample com-
pared to a common reference. This is an example for more of these pipelines and consist of a series of
command-line tools that need to run in speciﬁc order as jobs. To enable portability of these pipelines,
the environment is conﬁgured using an Ansible playbook, which installs EasyBuild for the reproducible
deployment of the pipeline and the binaries it uses and the Lmod module system for loading versioned
soŌware during pipeline execuƟon. We expect also a job scheduler such as SLURM to manage the jobs
as well as shared storage when spreading the load across mulƟple computer nodes. It is essenƟal that
the pipelines can be deployed without root/admin permissions.
• The most recent version of the pipeline including installaƟon instrucƟons is documented here:
http://molgenis.github.io/pipelines/.
• For soŌware dependency management this pipeline relies on EasyBuild9 @ compile / installaƟon
Ɵme and Lmod10 @ run Ɵme.
Lmod is installed as root by sys admins and from the repos of the Linux distro used. EasyBuild on
the other hand is installed by deploy admins (bioinformaƟcians) without root privileges.
The DNA pipelines contains 20+ steps, which can be divided in 4 parts:
1. DemulƟplexing: conversion of raw sequence machine output for mulƟplexed samples into se-
quence reads per sample. For example for Illumina machines the raw data consists of base calls
per cycle in BCL ﬁle format. The raw data formats are sequencing plaƞorm speciﬁc; hence there
is no standard. For sequence reads the de facto standard ﬁle format is gzip compressed FastQ
(*.fq.gz), which contains strings of nucleoƟdes A, T, C or G and associated quality scores.
2. Alignment of sequence reads to a reference genome. De facto standard ﬁle format for aligned
reads: Binary SAM (*.bam)
9 https://github.com/hpcugent/easybuild
10 https://www.tacc.utexas.edu/research-development/tacc-projects/lmod
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3. Variant calling to determine where samples diﬀer compared to the reference genome. De facto
standard ﬁle format for variant calls: bgzip compressed VCF (*.vcf.gz)
4. Quality control. No de facto standards exist, but QC reports are usually a PDFwith tables and plots
of summary staƟsƟcs.
Due to the nature of the raw data, the ﬁrst ‘demulƟplexing’ step is performed either directly on the
sequence machine itself or on a dedicated server close to the sequence equipment. (The raw sequence
data usually contains many and small ﬁles, which makes them ineﬃcient to transfer over networks or
store on large parallel storage systems). Once the raw data is converted into FastQ ﬁles these can be
processed eﬃciently in parallel on clusters. Processing does not require the use of MPI as the data can
be split in chunks (per sample or per chromosome or per per chromosome arm or even smaller regions
when necessary), which can be processed independently of each other.
The size of the data will depend on the size of the genome of the species invesƟgated and the genomic
region analysed. Typical for human data:
1. Gene panels:
a) 50–150 genes.
b) ≪2% of the complete genome
2. Whole Exome Sequencing (WES)
a) 23,000 genes.
b) 2–5% of the complete genome depending on amount of included ﬂanking sequence data
3. Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS)
a) 100%
b) 60–100GB per sample for reads in FastQ format
c) Another 60–100GB per sample for aligned reads in BAM format
d) <1GB for variants in VCF format, QC report, logs, etc.
Resource requirements diﬀer per type of job:
• WallƟme ranges from 1 minute to 64 hours
• Nodes is always 1 with cores per node ranging from 1 to 21
• Memory ranges from 1GB to 32GB
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The smallest amount of resources is consumed by the jobs that produce the ﬁnal QC reports: 1 minute
wallƟme, 1 core and 1 GB RAM. (These jobs may even complete with less resources, but these are the
smallest numbers we can specify in our current job scheduling system.)
ImplementaƟon of this pipeline consists of many applicaƟons developed by various research insƟtutes
/ projects and wriƩen in various languages. The heterogeneity of the soŌware stack results in heteroge-
neous resource requirements for diﬀerent steps of the analysis. In addiƟon the heterogenity can make
it challenging to get all dependencies installed, which makes automated deploy management a must.
The core apps include:
• FastQC11 for quality control of FastQ ﬁles (wriƩen in Java)
• BWA12 for alignment (wriƩen in C)
• Sambamba13 for BAM ﬁle processing (wriƩen in D)
• GATK14 “best pracƟces” for variant calling (wriƩen in Java)
• R15 for staƟsƟcs (wriƩen in R, C, C++ and Fortran)
• Molgenis Compute16 for job orchestraƟon (wriƩen in Java)
• Scripts and “glue” wriƩen in various scripƟng languages like Perl, Python, Bash, Ruby, Lua, etc.
Full descripƟonof all the steps canbe foundat http://molgenis.github.io/pipelines/ngs-protocols.
A summary overview is visible in Figure 2.
The BBMRI.cz has similar workﬂows to the ones described above for the BBMRI.nl, with the following
computaƟonal and storage capaciƟes used: input 60–100GB for a single run, .fq.gz (gzipped compressed
FastQ standard text ﬁles that contain reads); output 60–100GB of BAM ﬁles (binary alignment format
standard) and <1GB VCF genotype ﬁle (variant calling format) and addiƟonally small script and log ﬁles.
Depending on the size of input data, the BBMRI.cz has various capacity needs: 1–20 CPU cores, RAM
memory ranges from 1GB to 32GB, wallƟme ranges from 1 minute to 64 hours.
11 http://www.bioinformatics.babraham.ac.uk/projects/fastqc/
12 http://bio-bwa.sourceforge.net/
13 hƩp://lomereiter.github.io/sambamba/
14 https://software.broadinstitute.org/gatk/
15 https://www.r-project.org/
16 http://molgenis.github.io/software/compute
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Figure 2: Summary of the NGS_DNA pipeline. Dataﬂow from top to boƩom; parallel tasks are shown
next to each other. At various steps the analysis is run split in smaller parallel jobs (not shown),
e.g., alignment is parallelised per NGS machine run, variant calling is run for each of the 23
chromosomes separately. An analysis can consist of up to hundreds of samples resulƟng in a
sizeable analysis task.
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4 EvaluaƟon of informaƟon security consideraƟons for diagnosƟcs
The cloud provider and the intermediary who implements the pipelines must demonstrate that the fa-
cility appropriately addresses informaƟon integrity and security consideraƟons. This is because many
biobank data, such as NGS results, are classiﬁed as ‘high risk’ with regard to data conﬁdenƟality due to
privacy concerns. When NGS data is used in a diagnosƟcs seƫng the risks with regard to data integrity
as well as data availability are also high; When data is required for treatment, it cannot arrive late or be
wrong, because a system failed. In case of research a lower availability may be acceptable.
Many of these requirements are deﬁned in internaƟonal standard such as ISO/27002:2013 [3] (H5-15),
while naƟonal regulaƟonmight apply as described by BBMRI-ERIC in the report “Security and Privacy Ar-
chitecture of BBMRI-ERIC IT” [4]. Belowwe summarize themost important constraints for which wewill
evaluate the cloud pilot implementaƟons. For this pilot, we assume that permanent data storage with
backups is addressed by the biobank/health care provider and that we only need address informaƟon
security for the temporary storage used during the analysis in the cloud. Some of these requirements
will need to be demonstrated by the cloud provider and some by the pipeline provider/operator. Below
we summarize examples of the issues on which we will need to report and evaluate measures.
4.1 General
A Risk Assessment (RA) has been performed and regularly updated. This RA consists of the following
four phases:
• Phase 1: Business Impact Analysis (BIA) to determine risk with regard to data integrity, data avail-
ability and data conﬁdenƟality (none, low, medium, high)
• Phase 2: Decide whichmanagementmeasures from (ISO) standards are relevant based on the risk
as determined in the BIA.
• Phase 3: A self assessment is made where the infrastructure describes how the relevant manage-
ment measures have been implemented. There will always be a “Risidual Risk” leŌ. This must
be acceptable to the client/customer that wants to use the infrastructure. If the Residual Risk is
deemed unacceptable it’s either back to the drawing board to redesign part of the infrastructure
and update the self assessment or the infrastructure cannot be used.
• Phase 4: Regular audits to check whether the management measures as described in the self
assessment are implemented “as adverƟsed”
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4.2 Demonstrate measures to ensure data integrity
When NGS data is used in a professional research or diagnosƟc seƫng there is high risks with regard to
data integrity, e.g., in light of reproducibility of the analyses or errors that impact paƟent lives. Before
a cloud can be used for these use cases the security oﬃcer of the user insƟtutes may require measures
such as:
• Check for corrupƟon or manipulaƟon (e.g., compute and verify md5 checksums) aŌer data is
moved/copied.
• Ensure correct input of the pipelines, for instance by using input validaƟon of ﬁles and parameters.
• SeparaƟon of development, acceptance and producƟon environments.
• ValidaƟon of analysis pipeline aŌer development, automated tesƟng and veriﬁcaƟon when a pre-
viously validated pipeline is deployed in the acceptance or producƟon environment.
• Version management of the soŌware (e.g. Git, Mercurial) and of the deployment conﬁguraƟons
(e.g. Ansible, Puppet) to ensure that exactly the same setup as previously validated on another
infra site can be deployed on new site. In addiƟon this allows for rollback in case a setup fails
validaƟon tests aŌer updates/upgrades.
• SOPs and checklists up to diagnosƟcs standards.
• Minimize the contact interfaces to other systems (in parƟcular those having lower informaƟon
security levels).
4.3 Demonstrate measures to ensure data conﬁdenƟality
Many biobank data, such as NGS results, and also diagnosƟc data are classiﬁed as ‘high risk’ with regard
to data conﬁdenƟality due to privacy concerns. Before a public cloud can be used for these use cases
the security oﬃcer of the user insƟtutes may require measures such as:
• IsolaƟon of users and groups so that data cannot be shared accidentally.
• Chain of trust, federated idenƟty and authorizaƟon (e.g., OpenConext + COmanage17) to ensure
that when employees change funcƟon or leave the insƟtute, their access is revoked within a rea-
sonable Ɵme frame.
• Secure upload/download data transfer channel.
17 http://www.internet2.edu/products-services/trust-identity/comanage/
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• Access to a paƟent’s data limited to employees involved in the treatment of that paƟent. When
part of the work is outsourced to a third party (e.g., maintenance of hardware) this third party
must have an adequate ‘data processing agreement’.
• Ensure that no idenƟﬁable data is leŌ behind aŌer a certain amount of Ɵme to comply with data
destrucƟon laws/guidelines and also when the contract is terminated.
• Ensure that physical access to hardware / data centres is logged and suﬃciently protected by
means of keys. Access must be restricted to a known set of individuals for which legal IDs (e.g.,
passports) were veriﬁed.
• Data is stored within the EU, cannot leave the EU and any company involved operates exclusively
under EU jurisdicƟon (e.g., company stock not listed on New York Stock Exchange.)
• Procedure for reporƟng data ‘leakage’ incidents.
• Firewalls, stealth check, logging of aƩempts of unauthorized access.
• Minimizing the impact of unauthorized access, e.g., by minimizing the volume and ease of abuse
of the data by only keeping fracƟons that in itself are not enough to derive idenƟﬁcaƟon or abuse
whenever possible.
• InstallaƟon of new soŌware via change management (possibly including virus scanners).
• Ensure inacƟve users are disconnected to prevent unauthorized access from client machines.
• Procedure to safely dispose of hardware at the end-of-life (e.g., use self-encrypƟng hard drives or
put hard disks into a shredder).
4.4 Demonstrate measures to ensure reliable operaƟons/runƟmes
In case of diagnosƟcs, also the operaƟonal risks are classiﬁed as ‘high’—it would be unacceptable to
excessively delay or lose a result criƟcal for a diagnosis because of a system failure. Before a cloud can
be used for these use cases the security oﬃcer of the user insƟtutes may require measures such as:
• Redundancy by means of fall-back sites. AutomaƟc failover is not necessary. There should be no
single points of failure; Hence infra running at diﬀerent sites should be completely independent.
This includes not only the hardware but also the staﬀ managing the sites. Too liƩle staﬀ or staﬀ
managing mulƟple sites from a single locaƟon may result in a single point of failure.
• Redundancy for components at a certain site to reduce the chance of a site going down. E.g.
redundant power supplies.
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• Ensure quality of server hosƟng. For instance, climate control, emergency power to survive out-
ages, etc.
• Quota for resources like storage, cores and RAM to prevent exhausƟng them.
• Change management ⟹ validaƟon/veriﬁcaƟon or support contracts for the soŌware used.
ConﬁguraƟon management to guarantee reproducible analysis environments so that these do
not lead to accidental changes that may impact diagnosƟc outcome.
• Inventory management to ensure services are not running on the wrong or deprecated machines.
• Monitoring of system availability and auditability. This includes online status (e.g., Nagios,18 node
health check), logging, proving immutability of these logs and enabling ﬁltering of these logs to
derive operaƟonal insight as well as being able to invesƟgate the audit trail aŌer an incident has
occurred.
• Backup of pipeline soŌware, conﬁguraƟon and data.
• Data loss to a maximum of 24 hours.
• Predictable maintenance windows.
• Contract possible within the cloud provider and the cloud consumer covering all of above.
18 https://www.nagios.org/
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5 Conclusions
In this Deliverable we have tried to select both workﬂows that are typical for the biobanks aiming for the
private clouds (using FedCloud as a technology to deploy inside private clouds), as well as workﬂows we
will aƩempt at using the EGI infrastructure (using FedCloud as an infrastructure to get access to public
cloud from the biobank perspecƟve). ParƟcularly for the private clouds, we need to look into supporƟng
the SecƟon 4 and look also to the extent we can apply them to the public infrastructure.
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